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United Siates Recognition of Foreign,
Nonjudicial Divorces
A comparison of any two states' divorce statutes readily il-
lustrates the diverging procedures for obtaining a divorce which
exist from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Of even greater disparity
are the divorce laws from nation to nation. Indeed, in some na-
tions there is no formal divorce procedure whatsoever.' Most
foreign jurisdictions allowing divorce require some judicial pro-
ceeding, although Denmark and the provinces of Newfoundland
and Quebec authorize divorce by administrative and legislative
decree. However, many Asian and African nations authorize
divorce by religious ritual or mere consent of the parties. 2
There is significant concern as to the effect and validity to be
rendered foreign divorces obtained by procedures and methods
not conforming to those of the forum where recognition is
sought.3 Of particular concern in this Note is the recognition
by American courts of the atypical, usually nonjudicial, divorces
authorized in many foreign nations.
The conflicts questions generally arise in the following con-
texts: (1) A nonjudicial divorce is granted in a foreign jurisdic-
tion to a party who later emigrates to and seeks recognition of
his divorced status in the United States.4 (2) An American domi-
ciliary obtains a foreign nonjudicial divorce according to the for-
eign law and seeks recognition of that divorce in the United
1. Dissolution of Marriage, Annulment of Marriage, and Judicial
Separation, 17 U.N. ECOSOC 9, U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/415 (1963). Here it
is pointed out that no formal procedure exists in Argentina, Chile, Italy
or North Borneo.
2. See generally id.; H. COHN, FOREIGN LAWS OF MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE (1937); K. MrYAZAIx, A COMPARIsON OF LAWS RELATING TO
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE (1960); 1 E. RAEEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDy pt. 4, at 411-556 (2d ed. 1958); H. RINGROSE, MAR-
RIAGE AND DIVORCE LAWS OF THE WORLD (1911); Status of Women in
Family Law, 6 U.N. ECOSOC, U.N. Doe. E/CN.6/185 (1952); Olender,
Divorce Oddities Around the World, 52 WOMEN L.J. 110 (1966).
3. See generally 1 E. RABEL, supra note 2, at 497-520.
4. The quotas in 1966 for Asia and Africa, where the majority of
nations which authorize nonjudicial divorce are found, were 3,590 and
4,274, respectively. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 94 (88th
Ann. ed. 1967). For specific quotas per country see THE WORLD ALMANAC
AND BOOK OF FACTS 191 (1968). After the effective date of the new
percentage-priority immigration system on June 30, 1968, 79 Stat. 911
(1965), which replaced the quota system, the annual number of Asian
and African immigrants may increase under the system of priorities,
possibly up to the ceiling of 20,000 immigrants annually for any single
foreign nation.
NON JUDICIAL DIVORCES
States.' (3) A religious group grants a nonjudicial religious di-
vorce within the United States and its recognition as a valid di-
vorce is there sought.6 (4) Recognition is sought in the United
States by a foreign domiciliary who obtained a nonjudicial di-
vorce by methods authorized by his foreign nation while he was
temporarily within the United States.7 (5) A custom or cere-
monial divorce by the American tribal Indians is tested in an
American court.
I. DIVORCE RECOGNITION THEORY
Marriage and divorce are changes of individual status in
which society and the affected domiciliary state or nation have a
significant interest.8 The judicial test of "domicile" generally
5. A large number of Americans travel abroad each year into
countries where nonjudicial divorces are available. In 1966, passports
were issued or renewed for 22,670 Americans with destination Africa,
165,660 with destination the Far East, and 64,080 with destination the
Middle East. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 101 (88th
An. ed. 1967). Of immediate importance are the many American serv-
icemen currently serving in South East Asian countries who are marry-
ing Asian women. In South Korea, 1,265 servicemen took Korean wives
in 1964, and 771 during the first eight months of 1965; stated differently,
about one out of every 40 men stationed in South Korea marry each
year. N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1965, at 2, col. 3. In South Viet Nam, al-
though military restrictions have been placed on American servicemen's
connubial freedom, see NEWSWEEK, Aug. 8, 1966, at 31, from June, 1964
to November, 1966, 180 servicemen had been granted permission to
marry. N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1967, § L at 7, col. 1. In most of these
Asian nations nonjudicial divorce methods are available and possibly
could be utilized by servicemen to dissolve their Asian marriages.
6. Any organization, religious or not, that attempts to regulate the
marital status of its members rather than conform to the federal, state,
and municipal regulations applicable to all citizens potentially raises
this conflict issue.
7. A significant number of "nonimmigrant aliens" are present
within the United States each year on temporary visas. Of the total
2,341,923 nonimmigrant aliens in the United States in 1966, 39,327
were foreign government officials, 201,358 were temporary visitors for
business, 1,472,830 were temporary visitors for pleasure, and 55,716
were students. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 100 (88th
An. ed. 1967). Some of these temporary visitors no doubt seek divorces
while in the United States from American spouses or spouses remaining
in their foreign nations and desire to utilize their foreign law and
divorce procedures rather than try to satisfy the relatively strict
grounds required in most states. For many Asian and African nonim-
migrant aliens this reference to foreign divorce law often includes
nonjudicial divorces.
8. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229-31 (1945); Ditson
v. Ditson, 4 R.I. 87, 101-03 (1856); Wilson v. Wilson, [1872] L.R. 2 P. &
D. 435, 442; J. BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 702 (1935); G. CHESHRE, PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 264 (7th ed. 1965); J. STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS
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requires both physical presence and either an intent to remain or
a lack of any intent to remove.9 Since the domiciliary state is
where one or both spouses intend to remain, it is clear that that
state has an interest in their domestic status which is paramount
to the interest of any other jurisdiction. Therefore, recognition
rules should attempt to give validity to divorces obtained in the
domicile of one or both parties, if in conformance with the laws of
that jurisdiction. Such a policy would also prevent parties from
avoiding the divorce laws of their own state, as there would be no
recognition of a foreign divorce if obtained where the proponent
had no intent to remain-where he was not domiciled.
This concept that divorce jurisdiction is dependent upon
domicile within the territorial jurisdiction 0 is referred to as the
lex domicili n principle. Unlike our British counterparts, 12
Amercan jurisdictions maintain that the wife may procure a
domicile separate from that of her husband,13 and jurisdiction of
292 (8th ed. 1883); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 70,
comment b, at 269 (Prop. Official Draft 1967). In Anglo-American
law marriage is historically understood to be a union of one man and
one woman for life or until its dissolution for satisfactory cause recog-
nized by law. The leading case laying down this principle was Hyde v.
Hyde, [1866] L.R. 1 P. & D. 130. See Gagnon v. Gagnon, 23 Conn. Supp.
368, 183 A.2d 858 (1962); Morris v. Morris, 31 Misc. 2d 548, 220 N.Y.S.2d
590 (Sup. Ct. 1961); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-601 (1963); 24 Am. JuR. 2d
Divorce and Separation § 9 (1966); J. BEALE, supra at 665-71.
9. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, at § 15-18; J. BEALE, supra
note 8, at 89-194; A. EHMENZWIEG, CONFLICT Or LAWS 240-42 (1962);
H. GOODRICH & E. SCOLES, CONFLICT OF LAWS 40-46 (4th ed. 1964).
10. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1954); Ditson V.
Ditson, 4 R.I. 87, 93 (1856); Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier, [1895] A.C. 517,
527-28 (P.C.); Bater v. Bater, [1906] P. 209, 232 (C.A.); G. CHESHIRE,
supra note 8, at 340-41; H. GOODRICH & 1. SCOLES, supra note 9, at 256;
3 W. NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANULMENT 445 (2d ed. 1945); 1 E. RABEL,
supra note 2, at 428; J. STORY, supra note 8, at 313.
11. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1054 (4th ed. 1951), defines Leax
Domicillii as "The law of the domicile."
12. Because of possible undue hardship to the wife under the British
system from being unable to obtain matrimonial relief in instances of
her husband's desertion, the Matrimonial Causes Act § 18 (1) (1950) was
enacted. However, the wife's ability to bring a dissolution action in
other than the husband's domicile is still very restricted. See A. DIcEY,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 297-301 (Morris ed. 1958).
13. Cheever v. Wilson, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 108, 123-24 (1869); Phelps
v. Phelps, 241 Mo. App. 1202, 246 S.W.2d 838 (1952); Ditson v. Ditson,
4 R.I. 87, 107-08 (1856); 24 Am. JuR. 2d Domicile §§ 53-60 (1966). Jus-
tice Shaw in the 1833 case of Harteau v. Harteau, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.)
181, gives a review of the policy supporting the rule of separate domi-
ciles:
... [I] t shall not be considered in law, that the change of domi-
cile of the husband draws after it the domicile of the wife to
another State, so as to oust the courts of this State of their
[Vol. 53: 612
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the forum may be based on the domicile of either spouse."4 It is
well established that a marriage dissolution, granted within the
United States by a court having requisite jurisdiction, 5 is en-
titled to recognition in all states by the full faith and credit clause
of the Constitution. 1 Divorce judgments of foreign nations are
accorded nearly equal recognition in our state courts, based not
upon the full faith and credit clause, but upon the nebulous
concept of "comity."u7 Unlike sister state divorces recognized
jurisdiction, and deprive the injured wife of the protection of
the laws of this commonwealth and of her right to a divorce.
Id. at 186.
14. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298-99 (1942); RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 8, at §§ 71, 72; 24 Am. Jim. 2d Divorce and Sepa-
ration § 965 (1966); H. GOODRICH & E. SCOLES, supra note 9, at 262-66; R.
GRAVEsoN, THx COMPARATIVE EVOLUTION Or PRINCIPLES OF THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS IN ENGLAND AIM =ax U.S.A. 78-81 (1960); G. STUMBERG, CON-
FLICT OF LAWS 293 (3d ed. 1963).
15. The first Williams case, 317 U.S. 287 (1942), established that the
domicile of one party is a sufficient jurisdictional basis for divorce if
adequate notice of the proceedings is given the other spouse. See
RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, at § 71. A State's finding of domicile
still may be attacked collaterally in another state which has a sufficient
interest in the parties' marital status. See id. § 72, comment c, at 274.
New York departed from tradition in Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16
N.Y.2d 64, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86, 209 N.E.2d 709, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 971(1965), where a Mexican divorce was upheld where neither party was
domiciled in Mexico but the petitioner was physically present at the
proceeding and the defendant made a voluntary appearance through an
attorney.
16. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942). See generally
Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 1307 (1953), Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 1385 (1948). The
decree will be recognized even if the grounds upon which it was granted
were not sufficient in the recognizing state. Drew v. Hobby, 123 F.
Supp. 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Harris v. Harris, 165 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1957);
Ische v. Ische, 252 Wis. 250, 31 N.W.2d 607 (1948); H. GOODRICH & E.
SCOLES, supra note 9, at 260-62; 3 W. NELSON, supra note 10, at 483-84.
See also Bater v. Bater, [1906] P. 209, 217 (C.A.); A. DiCmr, supra note
12, at 304.
17. In Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1894), comity is
defined as:
. neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand,
nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is
the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to
the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, hav-
ing due regard both to international duty and convenience, and
to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are
under the protection of its laws.
See Kittel v. Kittel, 194 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 1967); Christopher v. Chris-
topher, 198 Ga. 361, 31 S.E.2d 818 (1944); Clubb v. Clubb, 402 I. 390, 84
N.E.2d 366 (1949). Comity generally is extended to foreign divorce
decrees on stricter standards than those applied in recognizing a sister
state's decree by full faith and credit. Decrees of foreign nations gen-
erally will not be recognized unless at least one of the spouses had a
good faith domicile in the foreign nation when the decree was granted,
1969]
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under the full faith and credit clause, no foreign nation's decree
or purported change of personal status will be recognized by
comity in a reviewing court if offensive to some public policy of
the state where recognition is sought.'8 Public policy here is a
broad description and generally refers to the morality and con-
science of the state as embodied in its constitution, statutes,
and court decisions. 9
II. NONJUDICIAL DIVORCES OBTAINED OUTSIDE THE
UNITED STATES BY FOREIGN DOMICILIARIES
It is well settled that nonjudicial divorces, obtained in for-
eign nations by domiciliaries of those nations and recognized as
legally dissolving a marriage by the lex domiciii, will be recog-
nized as valid within the United States.20 Most of the cases test
regardless of what the law of that nation requires for jurisdiction in its
courts. See Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1425 (1967), and cases cited therein.
18. Bethune v. Bethune, 192 Ark. 811, 94 S.W.2d 1043 (1936) (Mexi-
can divorce); Christopher v. Christopher, 198 Ga. 361, 31 S.E.2d 818
(1944) (Mexican divorce); Kapigian v. Der Minassian, 212 Mass. 412,
99 N.E. 264 (1912) (Turkish divorce); Warrender v. Warrender, 79 N.J.
Super. 114, 190 A.2d 684 (1963), aff'd, 42 N.J. 287, 200 A.2d 123 (1964)
(Mexican divorce); see Reese, The Status in this Country of Judgments
Rendered Abroad, 50 CoLum. L. REV. 783 (1950); cf. In re May's Estate,
305 N.Y. 486, 114 N.E.2d 4 (1953).
19. Christopher v. Christopher, 198 Ga. 361, 31 S.E.2d 818, 827
(1944); see McFarland v. McFarland, 179 Va. 418, 428, 19 S.E.2d 77, 83(1942); 35 WORDS AND PHRASES, "Public Policy" 456-539 (1963). Cf.
In re Estate of Barnes, 256 Iowa 1043, 1051, 128 N.W.2d 188, 192 (1964),
wherein the court discusses public policy as follows:
The term "public policy" itself is indefinite and is not sus-
ceptible of exact definitions. It recognizes a principle of law
which holds that no subject can lavfully do that which has a
tendency to be injurious to the public, or against the public
good, which may be termed the policy of the law .... It
means simply that policy recognized by the state in determining
what acts are unlawful or undesirable, as being injurious to
the public or contrary to the public good.
The following discussion will illustrate how loosely the public policy
concept has been applied to divorces obtained according to the sub-
stantive and procedural requirements of a foreign nation's law. Most
of the foreign procedures involved are typically considered contrary to
our public policy, but when there is no attempted evasion of domestic
law as in the Mexican migratory divorces, divorces by foreign domicili-
aries under their foreign law are not ccnsidered offensive.
20. Kapigian v. Der Minassian, 212 Mass. 412, 99 N.E. 264 (1912);
In re Rubenstein's Estate, 143 Misc. 917, 257 N.Y.S. 637 (Surr. Ct. 1932);
In re Spondre, 98 Misc. 524, 162 N.Y.S. 943 (Surr. Ct. 1917); Miller v.
Miller, 70 Misc. 368, 128 N.Y.S. 787 (Sup. Ct. 1911); Leshinsky v.
Leshinsky, 5 Misc. 495, 25 N.Y.S. 841 (Sup. Ct. 1893); Machransky v.
Machransky, 31 Ohio App. 482, 166 N.E. 423 (1927).
The same is true for England. See Lee v. Lau, [1964] 3 W.L.R.
750; Mahbub v. Mahbub, 108 SOL. J. 337 (1964); Silver v. Silver, 106
[Vol. 53: 612
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the validity of the Jewish "Ghet" divorces 21 obtained from Jew-
ish rabbis in eastern European nations which regard the Jewish
religious communities as self-governing in their personal affairs
and acknowledge the religious decrees as legally binding on Jew-
ish citizens.22 In each case the foreign law held the religious law
applicable, and thus recognition was granted in American for-
ums by an application of the lex domicilii principle.23
Another example of the lex domicili principle being used to
recognize nonjudicial divorces is Kapigian v. Der Minassian,24
where an unusual Turkish divorce was at issue. The respondent
and his first wife contracted a Christian marriage while dom-
iciled in Turkey. The wife subsequently renounced Christianity,
professed Mohammedism and married an adherent of that faith.
By Turkish law such a renunciation of Christianity automatically
rendered her Christian marriage null and void. The respondent,
relying on this law, established his domicile in Massachusetts
and married the petitioner, who subsequently sued for a decree
to nullify the marriage on the ground that the respondent's Turk-
SOL. J. 1012 (1962); Gillon v. Gillon, (Prob. Divorce & Admir. Div.
July 3, 1961) in Tim TimS (London), July 4, 1961, at 14, col. 3; Ratan-
achai v. Ratanachai, (Prob. Divorce & Admir. Div. June 3, 1960) in THE
Tnxis (London), June 4, 1960, at 10, col. 7; El Riyami v. El Riyami,
(Prob. Divorce & Admir. Div. March 31, 1958) in THE TIMEs (London),
April 1, 1958, at 5, col. 2; Yousef v. Yousef, (Prob. Divorce & Admir.
Div. July 31, 1957) in THE Tnwms (London), Aug. 1, 1957, at 6, col. 7;
Sasson v. Sasson, [1924] A.C. 1007 (P.C.).
21. Under Jewish civil law a Jewish rabbi can grant a valid,
binding divorce. Either party may seek out the "Ghet" for certain
specified causes. The rabbi finding reconciliation impossible will issue
the written bill of divorcement to the parties and they are free to
remarry. See generally address by Dr. Samuel Daiches, reported by
Society of Jewish Jurisprudence in 161 LAw Tnmas 244 (1926); Gurewicz,
Divorce in Jewish Law, 7 RES. JUDICATAE 357 (1957); Naamoni, Marriage
and Divorce in Jewish Law, 3 J. FAMVLY L. 177 (1963); Comment,
Jewish Divorce and the Civil Law, 12 DE PAUL L. Rav. 295 (1963).
22. See cases cited note 20 supra.
23. It is difficult to say what degree of affiliation with the Jewish
community is required by the foreign governments before a valid
divorce can be obtained. Most likely domicile or at least residence is
required of the petitioning party within the European nation before a
rabbi can grant a Ghet recognized as valid by the foreign law.
The issues usually arise in American courts after one or both
"divorced" spouses have emigrated to this country and have remarried.
The second marriage of one party is sought to be annulled on the basis
of the prior existing "nondissolved" marriage, see, e.g., Leshinsky v.
Leshinsky, 5 Misc. 495, 25 N.Y.S. 841 (Sup. Ct. 1893); or the original
spouse, upon the death of his or her former spouse, claims rights as the
legally married wife or husband, see, e.g., In re Rubenstein's Estate, 143
Misc. 917, 257 N.Y.S. 637 (Surr. Ct. 1932). It thus becomes necessary for
the court to determine the parties' true status following the foreign
divorce.
24. 212 Mass. 412, 99 N.E. 264 (1912).
1969]
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ish divorce was invalid, thus rendering the Massachusetts mar-
riage bigamous and void. Since both parties to respondent's first
marriage were still domiciliaries of Turkey at the time of the
Turkish annulment, the court concluded that their marital status
was subject to Turkish jurisdiction and law. Considering the
form of the divorce immaterial,25 and that it was not "so revolt-
ing to the moral sense of a Christian nation to prevent recogni-
tion and enforcement by its courts," 26 the court held that the
jurisdiction of a sovereign nation over its domiciliaries prevails
to effect a change of status under Turkish law. Consequently,
the divorce was declared valid and plaintiff's nullity petition was
dismissed.27 Thus, the only apparent prerequisites for recogni-
tion in American courts are proof of domicile in a jurisdiction
which recognized the divorce as valid, evidence that the foreign
law acknowledges the nonjudicial ceremony as legally binding,
and satisfaction to the court that the mode of divorce was not
repugnant to the public policy and morality of the forum state.28
No logical justification can be advanced for denying recog-
nition to nonjudicial divorces simply because the method is re-
pugnant to the forum. The basis of the Zex domicilii doctrine is
to acknowledge changes of status valid by the law of the divorced
parties' domiciles; thus the inquiry into the foreign law should be
limited to ascertaining that the divorce is legally binding under
25. Id. at 415, 99 N.E. at 265:
It does not matter that a circumstance rather than a decree of
court constitutes under the domiciliary law a dissolution of the
marriage tie. We are not concerned with forms of practice,
but with the ascertainment of the law of a foreign country.
26. Id. at 416, 99 N.E. at 266.
27. Decisions in family law cases are often motivated by the good
faith of the parties and policies favoring the stability of the family and
the protection of the offspring of the parties. See Kantor v. Cohn,
181 App. Div. 400, 168 N.Y.S. 846 (1918), where a party was estopped
from asserting her dower claim against a former husband based upon
an invalid divorce, partly because she had lived happily for 23 years
with her second husband. Kapigian v. Der Minassian and the Jewish
Ghet cases, however, appear to have been decided purely on the strict
application of the legal principles without regard to the individual
family situations involved.
28. See Kapigian v. Der Minassian, 212 Mass. 412, 99 N.E. 264(1912); Mahbub v. Mahbub, 108 SOL. J. 337 (1964). In People v. Kay,
141 Misc. 574, 252 N.Y.S. 518 (Mag. Ct. 1931), W and Hi began divorce
proceedings in Russia but were interrupted by the revolution. W
married H2 in Turkey believing H, was killed in the war. Upon an
action for divorce brought in the New York court, W's second marriage
was declared a nullity because there was no valid divorce from HI;
since Turkish law would not recognize polyandry in this situation, W's
second marriage was viewed as bigamous and consequently against
public policy in New York.
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that law. By questioning farther into the nature and merit of
the foreign methods of divorce, American courts would be pass-
ing judgment, by American standards, on the foreign law, and
disregarding the sovereignty of the foreign nation over its dom-
iciliaries. The apparent result of reviewing foreign divorce judg-
ments by domestic standards would be a breakdown of interna-
tional comity in this area and a repudiation of international
reciprocity among nations in divorce recognition.
Also, if foreign nonjudicial divorces were valid in the coun-
try of domicile but were not recognized elsewhere, "the parties
would be placed in a socially objectionable and legally indefen-
sible position."29 They would be relegated to a "limping mar-
riage," deemed married in all countries except their domicile.30
Thus, outside their present domicile neither spouse could le-
gally remarry, as the prior divorce would be considered invalid
and a subsequent marriage bigamous.
A further disadvantage of nonrecognition is that many
spouses, believing themselves validly divorced everywhere, as
respondent did in Kapigian v. Der Minassian, often detriment-
ally rely thereon in future domestic relations. Thus the policy
favoring universal recognition of personal status strongly sup-
ports a consistent application of the lex domiciii concept, which
recognizes all determinations of status lawfully obtained in the
domicile nation.
Variations on the fact situation of Kapigian and the Jewish
Ghet cases have not been judicially entertained, rendering fur-
ther applicability and usefulness of the lex domicilii rule un-
clear. The Massachusetts court would probably not alter its re-
sult in Kapigian if the husband were domiciled in Massachusetts
while the wife remained domiciled in Turkey at the time she
procured the "divorce." As noted above,31 it is believed in the
United States that the domicile of one spouse is a sufficient juris-
dictional basis for granting a divorce.3 2 If consistency in applica-
29. Roulston, The Validity of Divorce by Extra-Judicial Process,
25 Ausm. L.J. 578, 582 (1952).
30. See M. WOLFr, PRIvATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 355-56, 375 (1945);
Kennedy, Recognition of Foreign Divorce and Nullity Decrees, 35 CAN.
B. REv. 628, 632 (1957); Roulston, supra note 29, at 582. See also Wilson
v. Wilson, L.R. 2 P. & D. 435, 442 (1872).
31. See note 15 supra.
32. It may be argued that allowing one spouse to obtain an "easy"
nonjudicial divorce at his domicile, often upon no specific grounds, works
a grave inequity towards the other spouse who may be confined to
seeking matrimonial relief only through a judicial action on restrictive,
statutory grounds. Any interstate divergencies in divorce procedures
19691
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tion of legal principles to varying fact situations is the desired
policy in divorce adjudication, 3 it follows that the same juris-
dictional standards must apply equally to nonjudicial as well
as judicial divorce decrees. If at least one spouse was domiciled
in the foreign territory, the jurisdictional question should be
satisfied and further inquiry can be directed solely to ascertain-
ing compliance with the foreign law involved. Thus, nonju-
dicial divorces rendered at either spouse's domicile, valid by that
foreign law, should be recognized in United States forums by
the lex domicilii principle.3 4
Consider a further situation where husband and wife, dom-
iciliaries of France, obtain a Jewish Ghet divorce in Israe!35 and
now seek recognition of such divorce in an American court. The
lex domicilii principle could resolve this question also. If the
parties' French domicile recognized the Ghet as a valid dissolu-
tion of the marriage, the divorce should be recognized as valid
in America; conversely, if France would not accord the divorce
validity, it should not be recognized as valid here. In applying
lex domicilii in this instance the court would still be looking at
the law of the domicile, in particular the conflicts law of that
envisioned by the Supreme Court in the first Williams case, 317 U.S.
287 (1942), which firmly established the principle of jurisdiction based
on the domicile of one spouse, certainly are magnified in questions of
international divorce procedures as under discussion here. The only
alternatives, however, are not to allow unilateral divorces, or to revert
to the long rejected English system of maintaining the wife's domicile
to be that of her husband; both work more serious inequities to the
wife. See J. BEALE, supra note 8, at 197-201. The overall utilization of
the present American system of allowing ex parte divorces at either
party's domicile if adequate notice is given to the other spouse, seems to
provide fewer hardships than the other proposed systems.
33. The argument may be advanced that family law problems can
be better adjudicated by not strictly following established legal princi-
ples, but by arriving at a just and socially desirable result based upon
the specific facts involved. Certainly in many cases more equitable re-
sults could be reached. But a wide allowance of judicial discretion is
currently not possible under the American common law system of stare
decisis which is believed necessary for stability and certainty in the
law, convenience, and uniformity of treatment of all litigants. See Cat-
lett, The Development of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Extent to
Which it Should be Applied, 21 WASH. L. REV. 158, 159 (1946).
34. Cf. Mahbub v. Mahbub, 108 SOL. J. 337 (1964). Here a
unilateral nonjudicial divorce by the husband was upheld by an Eng-
lish court. However, it must be remembered that under English law
the wife's domicile is deemed to be that of the husband. See notes 12-14
supra, and accompanying text.
35. As discussed in part III infra, it is likely that the nonjudicial
methods of divorce in foreign nations are unavailable to nonnationals
or nondomiciliaries without satisfying religious or domiciliary qualifi-
cations.
[Vol. 53:612
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nation.86 "The law of the domicile" includes the domicile na-
tion's conflicts law, and giving effect thereto again allows the
law of the domicile to prevail .3 If the foreign conflicts law is
not considered, the American court is forced to look only to
France's substantive law which does not allow such divorces
executed there. Again the parties would have a limping mar-
riage-validly divorced in Israel and in France, pursuant to
French conflicts law, but not validly divorced in America.
American courts have attempted to follow the lex domicilii
rule consistently in recognizing nonjudicial divorces obtained in
foreign countries by foreign domiciliaries. Failure to look only
to the law of the domicile in these nonjudicial divorce recogni-
tion cases, and instead consider the place of the marriage, the
form and procedure of the divorce, and the parties' national or
religious law as relevant factors, leads to a variety of difficulties.
A perfect illustration of the confusion that can result is repre-
sented by the history of English cases determining recognition of
nonjudicial divorces.
Although England was the forerunner of the lex domicilii
principle3 8 and has recognized foreign nonjudicial divorces ob-
tained abroad by both spouses or by the husband domiciled
within a foreign territory,3 9 in certain cases the lex loci celebra-
36. In two divorce cases the New York courts tested their validity
according to foreign conflicts laws when the divorces were granted at
different foreign jurisdictions. Algazy v. Algazy, 129 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup.
Ct. 1954) (Romanian domicile; Nevada divorce; New York recognition
action); Dean v. Dean, 241 N.Y. 240, 149 N.E. 844 (1925) (Canadian
domicile; Pennsylvania divorce; New York recognition action).
37. Accepting the view that one can look to a foreign conflicts
law may be easier than ascertaining that conflicts law. The conflicts
law of the domiciliary nation may hold the divorce obtained valid only
if it is valid at the lex fori. One then would have to look to the law
of the forum where the nonjudicial divorce was obtained, which may
hold the divorce valid only if the spouse's national or domiciliary law
would regard it as valid. Thus, the cyclical renvoi problem. See gener-
ally 1 E. RABEL, supra note 2, at 75-90, and cases, statutes, and articles
there cited. It is interesting to note that divorce conflicts is one instance
where the RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS accepts renvoi principles. RE-
STATEMENT OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 8 (1934). If this highly unlikely
combination of facts ever arose to present this problem, an American
court could probably best reach a result by limiting its foreign law
inquiry to whether the domicile nation would regard the parties as
divorced if the parties were currently at their domicile, and avoid that
part of the domicile law which reverts to lex fori.
38. Shaw v. Gould, L.R. 3 H.L. 55, 85 (1868); Wilson v. Wilson,
L.R. 2 P. & D. 435, 442 (1872); Harvey v. Farnie, 8 App. Cas. 43 (1882);
Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier, [1895] A.C. 517, 527-28 (P.C.).
39. See cases cited note 20 supra.
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ticvnst of the maniage d the nonjudicIat character of the
divcrtec have determined its validity. It was established In Rem
v. Uca~mersnsithlt that Christian monogamous marriages may
not be dissolved by methods appropriate 'to polygamous or po-
tentially polygamous marriages' 2  Here a domiciliary of India,
while In England, married the petitioner, an English woman,
Shortly thereafter they separzted and he returned to India sub-
aequently forwarding to petttioner a "Talak" decisaration of di-
vorceV appropriate to h s Mohammedan religion and recogrized
as valid in India. A King's Bench decree thar the divorce could
aul be reoognized wras affimed by the Court o Appeals on two
grounds: (1) While the form of divorce was appropriate to Mo-
hammedan marriagea which are potentially polygamous, it wap
inappropriate to a rnarriage consummated in Bngland; (2) A ju-
dicial proeeding in a court of the domicile was lacking. Both
grounds have been gmerally ctWiFe$ 1 the former because it
gives weight to the lex loci celebrat anx in divorce proceedings
40 BRtAvKs L&W DzCv ARTaI5 10 5 (4th ed. 15t), detfnes Let Loe
Cevt~rationis as 'The law of the place where a contract is made."
41. [10 17 1 B,. 634 (C-A> [haeirefater c.ted as iers;rrA].
42. England continues to struggle wih the concept laid down in
Hyde v, Hyde, LU. I P. & D, 130 (1866>, that mariages, not only
polygamous, but poteutialy Polygwncus are offensive to the under-
standing of marriage in Chnistendom and cannot be tecognized as valid.
America courts have eliminated many of the difficulties arising in
England by disegaldig the potentially plygamus chaacter of a
marriage and viewing only de facto polygamy as imnaiid by our stand-
ards. See Barttolomew, Recognttion of Polygamous Marriages in
Amseric., :3 12wr & Cown. L~Q. 1022 (164>.
43. Klzasim divorce by Talak to a written or oral pronauncement
by the husbanh , at nyt"n without any reaon, that the marital rola-
tion is dissolved, The tsaxrisge is ianuediaely deemed dismlved upon
the husband's uttering three time " divorce you" See & AI, 2 Mo-
K&Lum=ar LAw 431-55 (1935; 3. Djaxcroun, Tar Mumax M&aTmnwau
Cvvar ;w SL'navroes. 3E0-7 (1963); A. Qaosr, ILAmia TumPwcrraf
mx Monrw Womp, 14-61 (IR) ; Ssornit E*ccorxwz oQr Imam 564-71(IM)JB F, TrAnar MunaxAPAx LAw 204-32 (3d ed. 1D40),
In t960, the Ministe of tustice in Cair" pronou ced ttat within the
United Arab Republic divoce by the free will of the hsband would
no longer be valid. In order to strengthen famil. tieu divon.w wuWIa
heneefoAh be vailable to either spouse only 4qvn specified grqwd$
MY. Thre Feb. 23, 19W, at ii, col 2, and May 10, 1960, at 2, c oL 6,
44. &. Gavnox, Corac or LAws 46t (4th ed. TOoft0; J. THor4as,
FPamaza ItWn'L Law 60 (1955); IK Wowr, supra note a, at 374-
77; Coh~n, Divarps anti the Donna?, 68 L.Q. 8U, 95-O8 (1IM5); Morris,
The RceqOg tio cj Poiytrrrous Marnwigts in Rnglish LOW, 00 HAMw L.Tt v 9uW, 102-ml (1053); Ryan, Conflict of .LZws-Recognition of "For-
eign DTvo-rWeurwciton to XMkue Declaa of Status, 32 Ctn, R,
TAi'. I7, 103 (195) SwcaminaCaan, Recovdniiun of Foreign Un htera
Dworccs, a the Engis Cwffict of Laws, 28 Mou. L. Rn'. 54C, 546-5(tSWI)
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and is thus in direct conflict with the lex domicilii doctrine, and
the latter because it is too narrow a limitation of the domicile doc-
trine.
Hammersmith was followed by two lower court decisions 45
before the Court of Appeals attempted to adjust its doctrine in
Russ v. Russ.40 Here a similar marriage was contracted in Eng-
land followed by residence of both spouses in Egypt, the hus-
band's domicile. While there, the husband performed a Mo-
hammedan Talak divorce and recorded it in the court records as
required by Egyptian law. In a later English action, where the
validity of the Egyptian divorce was at issue, the Court of Ap-
peals stated that the real ratio decidendi of Hammersmith was
the lack of a judicial proceeding 47 and distinguished the instant
divorce as having been judicially recognized at the domicile by
the recording of the Talak in the Egyptian court records. Al-
though the Court of Appeals seemingly intended the decision to
overthrow the Hammersmith theory by confining it to its specific
facts and thus return to the lex domicilii principle,48 the empha-
sis placed on the Egyptian court's involvement in the Talak's
recording implies that foreign divorces without some form of
judicial proceeding will not be recognized in England.49  The
past, and apparently still existing, importance placed on the
lack of a judicial proceeding misconceives the doctrine of lex dom-
icilii. Lex domicilii is not concerned with the judicial forum of
the domicile but with the law thereof. By disregarding non-
judicial divorces valid under the law of the domicile, the English
courts are repudiating the law of foreign sovereigns. The argu-
ment is well stated as follows:
The crucial question should be simply: Is the marriage dis-
solved by the law of the domicile? If that law permits a
45. Maher v. Maher, [1951] P. 342. See also Nachimson v. Nachim-
son, [1930] P. 217, 229 (C.A.) (Lawrence, L.J.).
46. [1964] P. 315 (C.A. 1962), aff'g [1963] P. 87 (1962), overruling
Maher v. Maher, [1951] P. 342.
47. The alternative holding concerning the polygamous character
of the divorce proceeding was apparently discarded. At page 326 of the
opinion Wilmer, L.J., in the face of lower court cases to the contrary,
attempts to confine this distinction to Hammersmith's specific facts.
Wilmer's reasoning is very unclear based on a distinction as to the
breadth of the Talak divorce within the domicile jurisdiction. Because of
the general disfavor expressed, however, any arguments as to the lex
loci celebrationis as being controlling in divorce actions will most
likely be disregarded. Cf. Nachimson v. Nachimson, [1930] P. 217 (C.A.).
48. [1964] P. 315, 327-28 (C.A. 1962).
49. See G. CHxsmxmE, supra note 8, at 348; Arnold, English Marriage
and Mohammedan Divorce, 112 L.J. 379 (1962); Swaminathan, supra
note 44, at 546-47.
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monogamous marriage to be dissolved in a manner "appropriate
to a polygamous marriage", or vice-versa, that is surely a mat-
ter for the law-makers of the country of domicil. It is not
necessary for us to admire the system or adopt it as part of
our law. All that is required to do is give the same recognition
here to the divorce that will be given it by the law of the
domicil and in its courts, and to abstain from making laws for
the country of the domicil governing the status of persons domi-
ciled there.5 0
Because several recent lower courts have recognized nonjudicial
divorces by applying only the lex domicilii doctrine,51 and the
intimation in Russ v. Russ that this is the desired solution, it is
likely that English forums will henceforth apply that doctrine
consistent with the American holdings.
52
III. NONJUDICIAL DIVORCES OBTAINED ABROAD BY
AMERICAN DOMICILIARIES
With the large number of American servicemen and civilians
in foreign countries,5 3 it is likely that many attempt an "easy"
foreign divorce to dissolve a marriage contracted with either a
national of that country or a spouse back in the United States."'
The validity of these divorces is a significant issue in the later
domestic relations of the Americans involved.
Whether a recognition question of this type may arise de-
pends initially upon whether an American national could utilize
50. Ryan, supra note 44, at 1038.
51. See note 20 supra. One commentator advances that the El
Riyami and Yousef decisions are in "direct conflict" with the Hammer-
smith holding and express the better view. Swaminathan, supra note
44, at 543.
52. Australia has remedied the Hammersmith problem by express-
ing the lex domicilii rule in legislation broad enough to include all
methods of divorce. The Commonwealth Matrimonial Causes Act § 95
(2) (1959) states:
A dissolution or annulment of a marriage effected in accordance
with the law of a foreign country shall be recognized as valid
in Australia where, at the date of the institution of the pro-
ceedings that resulted in the dissolution or annulment, the party
at whose instance the dissolution or annulment was effected
... was-
(a) ... domiciled in that foreign country;
See generally Z. CowE- & D. DA COSTA, MATRIMoNIAL CAusEs JuRisDIc-
TioN ch. 7 (1961).
53. See note 5 supra.
54. This discussion will center around unilaterally procured foreign
divorces without reference to bilateral divorces. If the necessary re-
quirements are satisfied by a single party such that the divorce ob-
tained will be recognized by American ccurts, the arguments for recog-
nition apply more forcefully if both spouses fulfill the same require-
ments in a bilateral proceeding.
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the methods of a foreign nonjudicial divorce. If foreign laws
preclude Americans from so doing, there is, of course, no recogni-
tion problem. Every nation has its own laws as to the avail-
ability of its divorce procedure to foreign nationals and these
laws are far from uniform. 5
Assuming an American in a foreign nation was able to utilize
the nonjudicial divorce procedure therein, recognition of that di-
vorce in America again depends upon the principles previously
discussed.56 The proponent of the divorce would have to prove
that at least one of the spouses was domiciled within the foreign
jurisdiction, that the divorce received was valid under the foreign
law where obtained, and that its recognition does not contravene
United States public policy.57
"Domicile," by American standards,58 would not be met by
an American serviceman serving a one year requirement within
an Asian nation, and any ex parte divorce he may obtain while
there could not be recognized within the United States.59 How-
ever, where an American takes a wife who is a domiciliary of a
foreign nation, and they together obtain a mutual consent di-
vorce,60 the result might well be different. Here the domicile
requirement in the United States would be satisfied by the wife's
foreign domicile.61 The divorce could, therefore, probably be
recognized in an American court if valid under the foreign law.62
55. See, e.g., Egawa, Divorce of Foreigners in Japan in XXTH
CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAw 336 (1961).
56. See notes 8-19 supra, and accompanying text.
57. The latter element of satisfying the recognizing court's public
policy may be the most troublesome. See note 19 supra.
58. Domicile requirements are not uniform among the foreign na-
tions and often fulfilling a certain residence requirement is sufficient.
For example, in the state of Chihuahua, Mexico, residence for divorcejurisdiction is satisfied by signing the Municipal Register upon ar-
rival in Mexico. Note, Mexican Bilateral Divorce-A Catalyst in Di-
vorce Jurisdiction Theory? 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 584, 597 (1966). See
generally 17 U.N. ECOSOC 18-20, U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/415 (1963).
59. Cf. Johnson v. Zarefoss, 198 F. Supp. 548 (E.D. Pa. 1961);
Murphy v. Travelers Ins. Co., 92 Cal. App. 582 (1949); Oliver v. Oliver,
325 S.W.2d 33 (Mo. App. 1959); Willie v. Willie, 167 Neb. 449, 93
N.W.2d 501 (1958).
60. Authorization of divorce by mutual consent is based upon the
belief that marriage is a civil contract between the parties and therefore
can be broken if both parties consent. See 1 K. MyAzAxI, supra note 2,
at 60-61.
61. See 24 Am. JUR. 2d Divorce and Separation § 965 (1966).
62. A marriage and divorce by an American temporarily within a
foreign country may be attacked in an American court as being collu-
sive and against the public policy of the state where recognition of the
divorced status is sought. Cf. Carrole v. Carrole, 232 Ark. 987, 342
S.W.2d 79 (1961). In recognizing a Virgin Islands' divorce decree at-
1969]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
A somewhat easier question arises on the alternative facts
of an American-domiciled woman marrying an Indian-domiciled
man. India and most Asian nations regard the wife's domicile to
be that of her husband.6 3 Since India's jurisdictional require-
ment of domicile would therefore be satisfied by both husband
and wife, the American wife could utilize the Indian civil divorce
methods under the Special Divorce Act and any religious pro-
cedure available if she had made a proper conversion. 4 The
Muslim husband could no doubt use the Talak and the parties
together could execute a mutual consent divorce. All of these
divorces should be recognized as valid within the United States,
for even though the wife would not necessarily be regarded as
domiciled in India by American standards, India would still be
considered an appropriate forum to determine the parties' status
since the husband is domiciled there. Thus, an American female
marrying a foreign domiciliary could obtain a foreign nonjudicial
divorce recognizable in the United States without changing her
American domicile.
Recognition of nonjudicial divorces obtained by Americans
in foreign countries has not been a significant problem because of
the restrictions imposed .by foreign nations on the issuing of their
nonjudicial divorces. However, in the instances suggested, if
the foreign spouse were domiciled in the foreign country and
the foreign divorce could be proved valid under the foreign law,
the only remaining obstacle to recognition of the divorce in an
American court would be establishing that the divorce was not
against public policy as recognized by that court.65
tacked as being collusive, a Massachusetts court in Chittick v. Chittick,
332 Mass. 554, 559-60, 126 N.E.2d 495, 498 (1955), presumed that the
Virgin Islands' divorce court had determined the collusion issue. A
stronger case of collusion could be made, however, where the divorce
was by mutual consent or religious pronouncement which would have
had no prior review of the proceedings in a foreign judicial forum.
63. K. DESAI, INDIAN LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 86 (1964).
64. Under Muslim law the husband only has the right to use the
Talak pronouncement of divorce. See id. at 136-39. Until 1939, a
Muslim wife's right to divorce was quite restricted, but the Dissolution
of Muslim Marriage Act of 1939 granted specific grounds for divorce
causes for Muslim wives.
65. In the suggested case of Americans contracting and dissolving
a marriage while only temporarily abroad, an American court may hold
the divorce not valid as against public policy in order to deter such
future relationships. See notes 18 & 19 supra, and accompanying
text. It could logically be argued, however, that if the divorce were to
be held as invalid against public policy, the marriage likewise should be
declared a nullity as the marriage exhibited a fraudulent mutual con-
sent to be bound in the marriage contract. Cf. United States v. Lut-
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IV. NONJUDICIAL DIVORCES PERFORMED WITHIN THE
UNITED STATES
In America's early history, the majority of the states which
accepted divorce as a social necessity empowered the state legis-
latures to grant divorces to petitioning parties.0 6 Legislative
divorces were not prohibited by the United States Constitution
nor most of the state constitutions. 67 By the end of the nine-
teenth century, however, exclusive jurisdiction was granted to
the courts by state constitutions" or statutes, 9 often expressly
negating the power of the legislatures to grant divorces.7 0 Each
state thus designated particular tribunals for jurisdiction in di-
vorce proceedings subject only to the procedures specified by the
individual state legislatures.7 ' A choice of law concept, which
might be called the "territorial jurisdiction of principle," is gen-
erally followed by American jurisdictions. This concept applies
the lex for 72 to divorce suits of those domiciled within the
forum17 the divorce laws of other states or nations having no
wak, 195 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1952), af-'d 344 U.S. 604, rehearing denied,
345 U.S. 919 (1953).
66. See, e.g., Starr v. Pease, 8 Conn, 541 (1831); Levins v. Sleater,
2 Green 604 (Iowa 1850); Cabell v. Cabell's Adm'r, 58 Ky. (1 Met.) 319
(1858); Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 480 (1863); Appendix, 16 Me. 479
(1840).
67. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518
(1819); see cases cited note 66 supra. See also Clark v. Clark, 10 N.H. 380
(1839).
68. See, E.g., DEL. CoxsT. art. 2, § 18; KAN. CONsT. art. 2, § 18;
N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
69. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 34, § 20 (1959); ME. REv. STAT. Ax.
tit. 4, § 152, tit. 19, §§ 122, 663 (1964); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-
2-6 (1966).
70. See, e.g., MINN. CONST. art. 4, § 28; N.C. CoxsT. art. II, § 10;
TEm-. CONST. art. 11, § 4.
71. With many variations the divorce statutes usually designate
the courts with divorce jurisdiction, the grounds and defenses available,
residence and domicile requirements, notice and service of process re-
quirements, alimony and property dispositions, child custody, and in
some cases waiting periods for remarriage.
72. BLAcK's LAW DIcTIONARY 1055 (4th ed. 1951), defines Lex Fori
as: 'The law of the forum, or court; that is, the positive law of the state,
country, or jurisdiction of whose judicial system the court where the
suit is brought or remedy sought is an integral part." In the divorce
area, lex fori is state law binding on all courts within the state.
73. Several states will grant a divorce after the fulfillment of a
statutory "residence period" rather than a fully established domicile,
e.g., ARx. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-1208, 34-1208.1 (1962) (three months resi-
dence requirement), and such statutes have been held constitutional.
E.g., Wheat v. Wheat, 229 Ark. 842, 318 S.W.2d 793 (1958).
The presence of servicemen temporarily stationed within a state
has presented problems as to divorce jurisdiction. Usually there is no
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extra-territorial effect on divorce suits within American juris-
dictions.74 Conflicts now arise when a state's domiciliaries at-
tempt a divorce within its territorial jurisdiction by a method
not conforming to the state's judicial procedures.
With numerous nationalities and religious groups present in
the United States, problems develop when certain segments, be-
lieving that religious law must govern the personal status of
their members, issue religious divorces and regard them as valid
changes of status.7 5 The Mormons, upon settling in Utah, at-
tempted to regulate the personal status of their members with-
out regard to the laws of that state. It was not long, however,
before Utah ruled that Mormons were subject to its laws. In two
similar Utah Supreme Court cases76 the wives of intestates, hav-
ing been purportedly divorced by "church divorces," nonetheless
succeeded in their dower claims as lawful widows of the dece-
dents. Almost summarily the court rejected the church divorces,
holding them invalid under Utah law. Being domiciliaries
intention to make the temporary base a permanent residence so it is
difficult to hold his state of residence his domicile for divorce pur-
poses. See Weintraub v. Murphy, 244 S.W.2d 454 (Ky. 1951); McCauley
v. McCauley, 184 Pa. Super. 361, 134 A.2d 684 (1957); Annot., 21 A.L.R.
2d 1163 (1952). Several states have by statute granted divorce juris-
diction to servicemen's causes after a fulfilled residence requirement
(usually one year). See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-7-4 (1954);
Tnx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 4631 (1960).
74. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1894); Roth v. Roth, 104 Ill.
35, 44-45, 44 Am. Rep. 81 (1882); Miko Jung v. Rokusaburo Novaya, 47
N.Y.S.2d 48, 49 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1944); 1 E. RABEL, THE CONFrICT OF LAWS:
A CoMPARATm STUny pt. 4, at 453-57 (2d ed. 1958); J. STORY, CONFLICT
Or LAWS 291 (8th ed. 1883); see Rabel, Divorce of Foreigners-A
Study in Comparative Law, 28 IowA L. REv. 190, 122 (1943), where the
author describes the lex fori system of the American courts as "unique."
In several nations territorial laws do not apply to all citizens, and
members of certain religious communities are governed by their own
religious laws of marriage and divorce. In India, for example, Muslims
may use either the religious "Talak" form of divorce or the civil pro-
cedures specified by Indian law. See generally K. SAKSENA, MUSrI
LAW As ADMINISTERED IN ImIA AND PAKISTA ch. VI, at 260-98 (4th
ed. 1963).
75. Marriages, unlike divorces, are primarily religious proceedings
with only limited government intervention. As a favored institution
in our society, marriage is felt to require little regulation; divorce, be-
ing disfavored, is felt worthy of careful governmental regulation and
only allowed by judicial process on grounds specified by the legislatures.
Cf. Niskanen v. Niskanen, 371 Mich. 1, 123 N.W.2d 157 (1963); Wilkins
v. Zelichowski, 43 N.J. Super. 598, 129 A.2d 459 (1957); Phillips v.
Phillips, 48 Ohio App. 322, 193 N.E. 657 (1933); Brown v. Brown, 134
S.E.2d 222 (S.C. 1963).
76. Hilton v. Roylance, 25 Utah 129, 69 P. 660 (1902); Norton v.
Tufts, 19 Utah 470, 57 P. 409 (1899).
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within the territorial boundaries of Utah's jurisdiction, the Mor-
mans were amenable to the divorce legislation of the state and
their religious ceremonial divorces could not be recognized as
changes in status.
A recurrent problem, until recent years, has been the at-
tempts by Orthodox Jews to live as autonomous communities
and control the domestic relations of their members.7 7 As early
as 1873 it was authoritatively reported that Jews living in a
civilized country were amenable to the laws of that country.78
However, with Jewish Rabbinical Courts having authorized juris-
diction to render their rabbinical "Ghet" divorces in many east-
ern European countries, 79 many American rabbis erroneously be-
lieved such jurisdiction existed in the United States and granted,
to ignorant spouses, what they believed were valid divorces per-
mitting subsequent remarriage. A number of cases arose over
divorces procured by both spouses submitting themselves to a
tribunal of rabbis and in their presence fulfilling the procedures
for the Ghet.s0 Other Ghets were obtained by a single spouse in
America from a nonimmigrating husband or wife.81 In each case
cited, the party or parties obtaining the rabbinical divorces were
domiciled within the United States. Consequently, the American
courts unanimously rejected the argument that since the rab-
binical Ghet divorce was recognized as valid at the Zex loci
77. See G. HoRowrnz, THz SPIRIT OF JEWISH LAW 74-89 (1953).
78. Felsenthal, Remarks on Some Points in Jewish Law, 8 ALBANY
L.J. 292, 293 (1873). In countries where Jews are subject to civil
divorce laws, Jewish law still requires a religious divorce by the parties
before a remarriage may be effectuated. See N.Y. Times, April 19, 1964,
at 40, col. 5; Daiches, Divorce in Jewish Law, 161 LAW Tnms 244
(1926); Correspondence from Charles H. L. Emanuel, October 23, 1928,
in 72 SOL. J. 744 (1928); cf. Koeppel v. Koeppel, 138 N.Y.S.2d 366 (Sup.
Ct., Spec. Term. 1954).
79. See generally E. ScHEFTELOWITZ, THE JEwisH LAW or FA1IILY
AND INHER TANcE AND ITS APPLICATION IN PALEsTINE 24-60.
80. In re Schlau, 136 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1943); In re Cherney's Es-
tate, 162 Misc. 764, 295 N.Y.S. 567 (Surr. Ct. 1937); Shilman v. Shilman,
105 Misc. 461, 174 N.Y.S. 385 (Sup. Ct. 1918), affd, 188 App. Div. 908,
175 N.Y.S. 681 (1919); Kantor v. Cohn, 181 App. Div. 400, 168 N.Y.S.
846 (1918). See also Somberg v. Zaracoff & Rothblatt, [1949] Que.
C.S. 301; Preger v. Preger, [1926] 134 L.T.R. (n.s.) 670.
81. United States v. Zaltzman, 19 F. Supp. 305 (W.D.N.Y. 1937);
Petition of Horowitz, 48 F.2d 652 (E.D.N.Y. 1931); In re Spiegel, 24 F.2d
605 (S.D.N.Y. 1928); Albeg v. Albeg, 259 App. Div. 744, 18 N.Y.S.2d
719 (Sup. Ct. 1940); In re Goldman's Estate, 156 Misc. 817, 282 N.Y.S. 787
(Surr. Ct. 1935); Chertok v. Chertok, 208 App. Div. 161, 203 N.Y.S. 163
(Sup. Ct. 1924); Saperstone v. Saperstone, 73 Misc. 631, 131 N.Y.S. 241
(Sup. Ct. 1911); Falkoff v. Sugerman, 26 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 81 (1925).
See also Joseph v. Joseph, [1953] 2 All E.R. 710 (C.A.).
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celebrationis of the marriage it should be recognized here.82 The
conclusion of the courts was that once domicile by the person
seeking the divorce was established within a state's jurisdiction,
the state laws control his domestic relations and foreign laws
have no extraterritorial effect within the jurisdiction. S3 To al-
low such unofficial divorces would conflict with each state's sov-
ereignty to determine judicially the personal status of its own
domiciliaries.
For many of the uninformed parties who relied upon the
rabbinical divorces, their declared invalidity had serious conse-
quences: later marriages were declared nullities or criminally
bigamous, often bastardizing the issue thereof;8 4 long-forgotten
"divorced" spouses appeared to contest estate proceedings;85 and
applications for naturalization were refused.86 Applying the ter-
ritorial jurisdiction principle does work hardships upon those
who do not follow it, but these effects are still only the un-
pleasant incidents of a consistent application of the lex domicilii
principle. In all the cases discussed in this section,87 the party
or parties obtaining the nonjudicia, divorces were domiciliaries
82. Cf. Miko Jung v. Rokusaburo Novaya, 47 N.Y.S.2d 48 (Dom.
Rel. Ct. 1944) (marriage performed at a foreign embassy within the
United States held invalid); Khan v. Khan, 29 W.W.R. (n.s.) 181 (B.C.
S.C. 1959).
83. The majority of these decisions arose in New York State.
Article I, § 9 of the New York Constitution has an express negative
provision, which states, ". . nor shall any divorce be granted other-
wise than by due judicial proceedings. . . ." In Newfield v. Copper-
man, 47 How. Pr. 87, 89 (N.Y. 1873), judicial proceeding was defined as
a "proceeding before a competent court or magistrate in the due
course of law or the administration of justice, which is to result in any
determination of action of such court or officer." Clearly the rabbinical
proceedings did not satisfy this definition and were declared invalid
under New York law.
84. See Chertok v. Chertok, 208 App. Div. 161, 203 N.Y.S. 163 (1924);
Saperstone v. Saperstone, 73 Misc. 631, 131 N.Y.S. 241 (Sup. Ct. 1911);
Somberg v. Zaracoff & Rothblatt, [1949] Que. C.S. 301. In the Eng-
lish case of Preger v. Preger, [1926] 134 L.T.R. (n.s.) 670, 672, the
court after holding a Ghet divorce invalid, stated that "[t] he husband
could not go through a ceremony of marriage in any way which the law
recognizes as constituting a legal marriage without committing bigamy."
85. See In re Goldman's Estate, 156 Misc. 817, 282 N.Y.S. 787 (Surr.
Ct. 1935); Falkoff v. Sugerman, 26 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 81 (1925). But see
Kantor v. Cohn, 181 App. Div. 400, 168 N.Y.S. 846 (1918).
86. See United States v. Zaltzman, 19 F. Supp. 305 (W.D.N.Y.
1937); Petition of Horowitz, 48 F.2d 652 (E.D.N.Y. 1931); In re Spiegel,
24 F.2d 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1928). It is felt that because of the bigamous na-
ture of a later remarriage, the applicant lacks "good moral character" as
required by 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (1964). But see In re Schlau, 136 F.2d 480
(2d Cir. 1943).
87. See cases cited notes 76,'80, & 81 supra.
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within a state's boundaries. The nonrecognition of the religious
divorces can therefore be justified by the interest in consistent
application of the recognition principles previously discussed:18
(1) Under the territorial jurisdiction principle, the attempts to
utilize religious law and procedures directly conflict with each
state's right to apply its own law to divorce actions concerning
citizens within its territorial jurisdiction. (2) By the lex dom-
icili{ principle a divorce valid by the law of the domicile is to be
accorded recognition elsewhere, and in these cases the religious
divorces obtained were not authorized methods by the domicil-
iary state and thus not entitled to recognition.
V. NONJUDICIAL DIVORCES OF FOREIGN
DOMICILIARIES WITHIN THE STATE
An unusual recognition question arises when the lex dom-
icilii doctrine comes into direct conflict with the territorial prin-
ciple of jurisdiction. The issue arises on the following facts. H,
a Muslim from India, comes to the United States and marries W,
an American. 9 H, still retaining his Indian domicile, desires a
divorce and presents himself to an Indian or Muslim official
within the United States, thus submitting himself to Indian
jurisdiction and law and availing himself of the easy Talak di-
vorce. With numerous official emmissaries of foreign nations
present within the American and Commonwealth jurisdictions
obliged to aid the nationals of their countries, divorce by sub-
mission to the foreign law of one's domicile has occured several
times. 0 The approach taken by the Commonwealth courts in
these cases will again be used for purposes of comparison and
will be analyzed first to illustrate the potential difficulties.
88. See notes 8-19, 72-74 supra, and accompanying text.
89. Similar issues arise when H and W are both foreign domicil-
iaries and, while temporarily within the United States, retain their for-
eign domicile.
90. Foreign divorce decrees rendered by the courts of foreign na-
tions to their domiciliaries while temporarily within the United States
have been upheld. Oettgen v. Oettgen, 196 Misc. 937, 94 N.Y.S.2d 168
(Sup. Ct. 1949) (German "proxy" divorce upheld where parties were rep-
resented in German action by attorneys); Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 46
N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (Dominican Republic divorce obtained by
appearance before the Consul of the Dominican Republic in New York
City). See also Martens v. Martens, 260 App. Div. 30, 20 N.Y.S.2d 206,
rev'd on other grounds, 284 N.Y. 363, 31 N.E.2d 489 (1940), rehearing
denied, 285 N.Y. 607, 33 N.E.2d 542 (1941).
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A. CommowEALTH VIEW
The Commonwealth nations, which do not apply the terri-
torial limitations on jurisdiction in -divorce actions as stringently
as American states, have held the lex domicilii doctrine control-
ling in these cases and regard as immaterial the fact that a re-
ligious divorce was performed within their jurisdiction.91 In the
English case of Har Shefi v. Har Shefi a marriage was contracted
in Israel between petitioner, a Jewish woman of English domicile,
and an Israeli domiciliary. After a short residence in London,
and before the husband was to be deported, he delivered to
petitioner a Jewish Ghet at the Beth Din rabbinical court in
London. Petitioner thereupon asked the English court to declare
the marriage validly dissolved. The Court of Appeals0 2 consid-
ered whether the English courts had jurisdiction over the peti-
tion. Singleton, L.J., felt that the English courts could not enter-
tain jurisdiction since both husband and wife were Israeli dom-
iciliaries, by both English and Israeli law, and the courts of
Israel could best determine the validity of the divorce. How-
ever, both Denning, L.J., and Hodson, L.J., felt that the English
courts had jurisdiction to decide the validity of the divorce under
the laws of Israel.9 3 Upon retrial,1'4 the Probate Division held
the marriage "validly dissolved by the only form of divorce
which is open to a Jew domiciled in Israel."'95 The decision was
based wholly upon the lex domicilii principle, disregarding the
fact that the divorce was issued in London."6 Thus in recogni-
91. Varanand v. Varanand, 108 Sol. 3. 693 (1964); Har Shefi v.
Har Shefi, [1953] P. 161 (C.A.); Har Shefi v. Har Shefi (No. 2), [1953]
P. 220; Mandel v. Mandel, [1955] Vict. L.R. 51 (1954); see A. DICEY,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 308 (Morris ed. 1958). But see Russ v. Russ, [1964]
P. 315, 334-35 (C.A. 1962) (Davies L.J.).
92. liar Shefi v. ltar Shefi, [1953] P. 161 (C.A.).
93. No doubt this decision was a good deal motivated by a con-
venience argument. It would have been quite burdensome for the peti-
tioner to travel to Israel to institute the declaratory action and perhaps
it would have taken a considerable amount of time before judgment
would have been rendered.
94. HIar Shefi v. HIar Shefi (No. 2), [1953] P. 220.
95. Id. at 223-24.
96. Barnard, J., states at [1953] P. 161, 171 (C.A.):
I do not place any reliance on the fact that the bill of divorce-
ment was delivered in England. That does not make English
law applicable to determine the status of the wife. The parties
were at the time of the divorce domiciled in Israel, and the
validity of the divorce must depend on the law of Israel and not
on the law of England.
Reference again should be made to the discussion of the Hammer-
smith case, see notes 41-52 supra, and accompanying text, for the Har
Shefl divorce involved no judicial procedure, and neither Har Shefi
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tion cases arising in English courts, questioning religious divorces
procured within British territory, recognition will be accorded
where the religious law applied is that of the husband's dom-
icle97
A Canadian court met an unusual fact situation in Dame
Goldenberg v. Triffon and Dunn and Dame Vaughn9 with a
tortured application of the Har Shefi holding. A Jewish couple,
domiciled in Israel, commenced divorce proceedings in an Israeli
rabbinical court. Before the proceedings were completed, both
parties migrated to Canada and lived there as man and wife for
two years and until the wife requested the Israeli court to author-
ize a Montreal rabbi to complete the divorce. The Montreal
rabbi granted the bill of divorcement and after receipt of the bill
in Israel the Israeli court declared the marriage dissolved. The
Quebec Supreme Court rejected the argument that since both
spouses were domiciled in Canada they could not utilize a foreign
method of divorce and held that the test of domicile should re-
late to the time the "proceedings were commenced." 99 In this
case, that time was the initiation of the divorce proceedings in
the Israeli court when the couple was domiciled there.
In general, domicile is tested at the time of the initiation of
the proceedings, 10 0 but this rule was inappropriately applied to
the Dame Goldenberg facts. The specific act of divorce was per-
formed in Montreal by the Montreal rabbi after a period of co-
habitation in Canada as the marital domicile of the parties.10 '
Considering domicile at the time of the bill of divorcement in
Montreal would have been more appropriate and the divorce
would have been discarded as an unauthorized method contrary
both to the lex domicilii and the province's territorial jurisdic-
court considered this a factor. See Swaminathan, Recognition of For-
eign Unilateral Divorces in the English Conflict of Laws, 28 MOD. L. REV.
540, 548-49 (1965).
97. Compare Somberg v. Zaracoff & Rothblatt, [1949] Que. C.S.
301, with Mandel v. Mandel, [1955] Vict. L.R. 51 (1954).
98. [1955] Que. C.S. 341.
99. Id. at 344-45.
100. Cassen v. Cassen, 211 Ark. 582, 201 S.W.2d 585 (1947); Thomas
v. Thomas, 144 So. 2d 612 (La. App. 1962); Tanowitz v. Tanowitz, 209
N.Y.S.2d 895 (Sup. Ct. 1960); 24 Am. JuR. 2d Divorce and Separation§ 246 (1967).
101. In reviewing the case, Ryan, Conflict of Laws-A Bill of Di-
vorcement in Montreal-Domicil, 34 CAN. B. REv. 335 (1956), states that
according to the law of Israel foreign rabbis cannot dissolve marriages
of foreign Jews not domiciled in Israel. The religious methods of
divorce are available only to domiciliaries of Israel and thus not avail-
able to those Jews domiciled in Canada.
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tion. Another unwarranted statement made by the court was
that the Montreal rabbi was only a "representative and func-
tionary" of the Israeli court and was not usurping the function
of the Parliament of Canada in granting the divorce.10 2 Under
this view, any emissary of a foreign government or religion
could alter the personal status of its foreign nationals whether or
not domiciled within Canada, under the cloak of foreign author-
ity. Certainly the Canadian Provinces desire to maintain sov-
ereignty over the personal affairs oJ2 its domiciliaries, and not to
delegate such sovereignty to foreign nations through represen-
tatives within the Provinces.
B. AmrmicAN ViEw
American courts, by attempting to follow both the Zex dom-
icilii and territorial jurisdiction principles, have distinguished
the cases of nonjudicial divorces by foreign domiciliaries within
the United States as to the place of origin of the "actual divorce."
The courts, as will be seen below, look to where the divorcing
authority was exercised-either within the United States by a
foreign functionary, or by a foreign official in the foreign coun-
try. Divorces are upheld in the latter, but not the former.
Three similar decisions contested the validity of divorces de-
creed by the King of Denmark to Danish domiciliaries residing
in America who had applied for the divorces at the Danish Con-
sulate in New York City. 03 After admission of satisfactory proof
that divorce by royal decree was valid under Danish law,104 the
courts held the divorces valid because in each case the marital
domicile was still in Denmark and the parties voluntarily sub-
mitted to the jurisdiction of Danish law.
In Shikoh v. Murff' 05 a male Pakistani national, studying
in the United States, procured a declaration of divorce from his
wife, remaining in Pakistan, by application to the Spiritual Head
and National Director of the Islamic Mission of America in Brook-
lyn, New York. The Islam official granted the divorce according
to the laws of Islam and a copy was forwarded to the wife in
102. [1955] Que. C.S. at 344.
103. Wel v. Wel, 26 N.Y.S.2d 467 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1941); Hansen v.
Hansen, 255 App. Div. 1016, 8 N.Y.S.2d 655, rev'g 167 Misc. 155, 3 N.Y.S.
2d 485 (1938); Sorenson v. Sorenson, 219 App. Div. 344, 220 N.Y.S. 242
(1924).
104. See generally LirmRuY or CONGRESs, DIVORCE BY An=IsTRATIVE
DECREE IN DENMARK (1957).
105. 257 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1958), noted in 13 U. MI m L. REV. 240
(1958).
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Pakistan. In petitioner's subsequent application for naturaliza-
tion, the court affirmed a finding that the divorce was invalid.
Even though petitioner was a domiciliary of Pakistan, the court
applied the principle of territorial jurisdiction and held that any
divorce to be valid within the state must conform to the laws of
New York.10 The Danish Royal decree cases were distinguished
on the grounds that even though the Danish parties were "phys-
ically within the United States" the divorces were granted at the
foreign jurisdiction of domicile. 10 7 The Danish decrees were
actually issued from Denmark, whereas here, the foreign official
in New York provided the divorcing authority. Under these
precedents, therefore, recognition of a foreign divorce by foreign
domiciiaries while within this country depends upon the geo-
graphic origin of the authority that dissolved the parties' mar-
ried status.
Shikoh v. Murff implies that an ex parte proceeding of sub-
mission to foreign law as well as the bilateral proceedings in the
Danish Royal decree cases will be upheld if the divorce properly
originates from the foreign country. From the foregoing dis-
cussion'0 8 and the Supreme Court holding in Williams v. North
Carolina0 9 that divorce jurisdiction may properly be based on
the domicile of one party, this is the logical conclusion. One could
expect, however, that a United States court would view with
scepticism a foreigner procuring an easy foreign divorce from
an American domiciled wife. The wife could voice the strong
objection that in this type of ex parte proceeding she was unable
to contest the divorce and was completely at the mercy of the
foreign law." 0 Sympathies would certainly lie with the Amer-
ican wife, and a court may well disregard the legal precedents
that logically answer this conflicts question and protect the in-
terests of the wife by acknowledging her objections and hold the
divorce invalid as violative of public policy.
Most fact variations involving foreign domiciliaries who pro-
cure a foreign divorce while within the United States can be
resolved by ascertaining the origin of the divorce. In each case
106. 257 F.2d at 306.
107. Id.
108. See notes 31-34 supra, and accompanying text.
109. 317 U.S. 287 (1942); see note 15 supra.
110. Depending upon the circumstances in each case, objections
like the following may also be raised by the wife: lack of proper notice;
fraud on the part of the husband in both the marriage and divorce;
failure to provide adequate maintenance, alimony and support allow-
ances; and acquisition by the husband of an American domicile.
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of this type two basic questions must be answered: (1) Is the
party petitioning for the divorce subject to foreign jurisdiction
by being a foreign domiciliary under the American test of dom-
icile?"' (2) Was the divorce actually granted in the foreign na-
tion or only by a foreign representative within an American
state's jurisdiction?112 By answering these questions courts con-
fronting future cases of this type will, as in Shikoh v. Murff, con-
sider both the lex domicilli and territorial jurisdiction principles.
The English view, expressed in Har Shefi v. Har Shefi,113
that the lex domicilii principle is to control even if the divorcing
ceremony is performed within the English courts' jurisdiction,
is appealing. This is prompted by the just results reached
through the application of the law of the domicile to divorce
questions, wherever domiciiaries may be. Strictly applying lex
domicilii as done in Har Shefi, however, has potential disadvan-
tages. Allowing the law of the domicile to control, where the
divorce was by a unilateral declaration within England's terri-
torial jurisdiction, seems to conflict with the English belief that
exclusive jurisdiction rests within its courts over divorce peti-
tions, and that matrimonial relief should be granted only after a
judicial hearing.114 England's granting authority to representa-
tives of foreign nations to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction
over their domiciiaries while in England could have adverse con-
sequences to the jursdiction and sovereignty of the English court
system. Under the rule established in Shikoh v. Murff, the
competing policies of maintaining the jurisdictional sovereignty
of the American divorce courts and providing consistent results
with a minimum of hardship to the parties are both considered.
As the Danish cases illustrate, American courts will uphold these
divorces only when they can be justifiably regarded as emanat-
ing from a foreign jurisdiction. On the other hand, Shikoh v.
Murff illustrates how a court's jurisdiction over the marital
111. Questions relating to domiciliaries of one foreign country ob-
taining a nonjudicial divorce under a legal system of a different for-
eign nation can be readily answered by the lex domicilii doctrine as
discussed in notes 35-37 supra, and accompanying text.
112. Although this distinction seems somewhat insignificant, it should
be readily recognizable in any divorce situation that arises, thus allow-
ing future cases to align themselves "properly" as to whether the mar-
riage dissolving factor was forthcoming from the foreign domicile or
the American functionary. See 13 U. M.Aain L. REv. 240, 245 (1958).
113. [1953] P. 161 (C.A.); [1953] P. 220.
114. It was recently suggested in reviewing the Har Shefi decision
that the court there could beneficially have imposed territorial juris-
dictional limitations on the forms of divorce issued within England's
territory. Russ v. Russ, [1964] P. 315, 334-35 (C.A. 1962) (Davies, L.J.).
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status of those within its territory is preserved by invalidating a
divorce procured within the United States. Requiring a foreign
domiciliary to obtain his divorce directly from his domicile, rather
than from a functionary within the United States, is a minor
hardship compared to the potential dissipation of the authority
and sovereignty of the American courts over divorce cases should
such foreign methods of divorce be openly allowed within United
States territory.
VI. NONJUDICIAL DIVORCES BY AMERICAN INDIANS
A collateral set of nonjudicial divorce recognition issues con-
cerns the domestic affairs of the American tribal Indians. The
presence of autonomous Indian reservations within the states'
territorial jurisdictions presents unusual conflicts between In-
dian and state law."6  Because the Indians were established in-
habitants of the American continent before any state government
was formed, the tribes are recognized as "distinct, independent,
political communities""16 with powers of self-government, not
through a delegation of powers from the federal government,
but by reason of their original sovereignty." 7 As such, the In-
dian tribes possess all the powers of a sovereign state subject
only to the plenary powers of Congress granted in the Consti-
tution.1 18 So long as the Indians live upon their tribal reserva-
tions they are not subject to the civil laws of the states and may
regulate their internal affairs as independent nations." 9
115. See generally J. ANGLE, FEDERAL, STATE AND TRIBAL JURISDICTION
ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS IN ARIZONA (1959); F. CoHEN, HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAw (1941); U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, OFFICE OF THE SOLIC-
ITOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAw (1958); Brown, The Indian Problem and the
Law, 39 YALE L.J. 307 (1930); Cohen, Indian Rights and the Federal
Courts, 24 MIm. L. REV. 145 (1940); Rice, The Position of the American
Indian in the Law of the United States, 16 J. Comp. LEG. 78 (1934).
116. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
117. See F. COHEN, supra note 115, at 122-123. For a general discus-
sion of government treatment of the American Indians, their rights,
liberties, and restraints, both past and present, see a 12 part series
beginning in Christian Science Monitor, March 2, 1968, at 1.,
118. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S.
375 (1886); Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1866); New York
Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761 (1866); F. COHEN, supra note 115, at 123.
Until 1871, the Indian nations were dealt with via treaties. See, e.g.,
Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). Follow-
ing the 1871 statutory prohibition of Indian treaties, 16 Stat. 566 (1871),
the Indian nations have been treated as wards of the federal government,
retaining their sovereignty under what has been called the "guardian-
ship concept." Bartholomew, Recognition of Polygamous Marriages in
America, 13 INT'L & Com. L.Q. 1022, 1035 (1964).
119. See U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR, FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 395-454 (1958).
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In the specific area of domestic relations, many pagan beliefs
of the tribes conflict with the American Judaic-Christian view of
marriage and divorce. Nonceremonial polygamous marriages
and informal divorces by agreement are common among many
tribes.120 It has long been recognized that Indian marriages and
divorces by tribal custom are acknowledged as valid by the fed-
eral and state governments.121 By dispensing with the territor-
ial feature of federal and state courts' jurisdiction, the Indian
tribes are treated as autonomous foreign nations and the usual
principles of comity are applied to determine the validity of In-
dian marriages and divorces. 22 The lex domicilii doctrine is
consistently applied, for the Indian marriages and divorces will
be recognized only if the parties are domiciled within the recog-
nized Indian reservations and thus subject to its laws. If the
tribe has been dissolved, or its members are domiciled off the
reservation territory, the tribal laws and customs no longer gov-
ern and the individual Indians are amenable to the laws of the
appropriate state. 23
This conflicts problem has diminished in recent decades as
many of the reservations have been formally or informally dis-
banded,1 24 and many of the Indians have been Christianized and
acclimated to "white man's society.-' 1 2 5  However, with no ex-
120. Id. at 423-28.
121. See Morris v. Stockey, 170 F.2d 599 (10th Cir. 1948), cert.
denied, 336 U.S. 914 (1949); Kunkel v. Barnett, 10 F.2d 804 (N.D. Okla.
1926), affd sub noma., 19 F.2d 504 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 563
(1927); Yakima Joe v. To-Is-Lap, 191 F. 516 (D. Ore. 1910); Wall v.
Williamson, 8 Ala. 48 (1845); La Framboise v. Day, 136 Minn. 239, 161
N.W. 529 (1917); Earl v. Godley, 42 Minn. 361, 44 N.W. 254 (1890);
Unussee v. McKinney, 133 Okla. 41, 270 P. 1096 (1928); cf. Act of May
2, 1890, ch. 182, § 38, 26 Stat. 81; 24 A.m. Ju. 2d Divorce and Separation
§ 8 (1966); 27B C.J.S. Divorce § 334 (1959); Annot., 74 A.L.R. 1538
(1931).
122. Earl v. Godley, 42 Minn. 361, 362-63, 44 N.W. 254, 255 (1890);
Morgan v. McGhee, 5 Humph. 13, 14 (Tenn. 1844); see Bartholomew,
supra note 118, at 1042.
123. Roche v. Washington, 19 Ind. 53, 81 Am. Dec. 376 (1862);
Moore v. Wa-me-go, 72 Kan. 169, 83 P. 400 (1905); La Framboise v.
Day, 136 Minn. 239, 161 N.W. 529 (1917); State v. Ta-cha-na-tah, 64 N.C.
614 (1870); In re Wo-gin-up's Estate, 57 Utah 29, 192 P. 267 (1920).
124. Nebraska has specifically legisl.ted that Indian marriages and
divorces by custom are invalid. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 42-401-407 (1943).
From the foregoing discussion of Indian sovereignty, such a statute
should be held unconstitutional by federal preemption if it were ever
challenged by a Nebraskan Indian. Nebraska still has five organized
tribes within its territory, so the statute someday could be challenged.
Christian Science Monitor, March 2, 1968, :map at 9.
125. See generally Christian Science Monitor, 12 part series be-
ginning March 2, 1968, at 1.
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press authority to the contrary, one could still expect an Indian
divorce between Indians domiciled within the reservation to be
recognized as a valid change of personal status.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although divorce laws vary significantly among the nations,
and both Americans and foreigners seek recognition of noncon-
forming divorce proceedings, American courts have developed
logical and clear doctrines applicable to both judicial and non-
judicial divorce methods. The application of the lex domicilii
and the territorial jurisdiction doctrines consistently resolve the
unusual divorce situations heretofore discussed. The conclusions
may be summarized as follows: (1) Nonjudicial divorces ob-
tained outside the United States by foreign domiciliaries will be
recognized as valid by American courts if such divorces are leg-
ally valid by the law of the domicile. (2) Nonjudicial divorces
procured by Americans abroad, if available in any foreign nation,
will only be recognized within the United States if at least one
spouse was domiciled within the foreign nation and the divorce
is not against the public policy of the recognizing forum. (3) No
nonjudicial divorce performed within a state's jurisdiction by
domiciliaries of that state will be recognized as valid. (4) Non-
judicial divorces by foreign domiciliaries obtained while within
the Unted States may be recognized as valid if the act of dis-
solution emanated from the foreign nation. (5) Nonjudicial di-
vorces of the American Indians will be recognized by treating the
Indian reservations as foreign nations and utilizing the ordinary
conflicts principles.
Use of the lex domicilii principle allows equal recognition of
judicial and nonjudicial divorces if valid under the law of the
domicile. As a result, the great majority of foreign divorces are
recognized as valid, thus supporting the international law policy
favoring comity and universal recognition of personal status. In
addition, since the concept of Zex domicilii is facilitated by re-
quirements of intent to remain,126 attempts to avoid the laws of
the state in which the party or parties intend to remain are elim-
inated. Finally, the lex domiciii principle guarantees the sov-
ereignty of the state with the paramount interest in marital
status, that is, the state where the party or parties intend to
reside permanently.l 27
126. See note 9 supra, and accompanying text.
127. A comparison of the various nations' conflicts laws as to di-
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vorce recognition was beyond the scope of this discussion. However,
even the English principles-which have been used in this Note for pur-
poses of comparison-being similar but not identical to those in the
United States, show discrepancies and inconsistencies when applied to
the nonjudicial divorce situations here discussed. Dr. Rabel, in
comparing different divorce systems, maintains that the methods used
abroad are not preferable to the strict territorial application of lex fori
used by the American courts. See 1 E. RPABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAws: A
COMPARATIVE STuDY pt. 4, at 493-96 (2d ed. 1958).
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